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ABSTRACT 
With respect to the unique legal setting and organizational structure under which Islamic 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (I-REITs) operate, this paper tried to explicate its practiced 
governance model by wading through the quadrilateral structure: market-centric, 
relationship-based, transition and emerging governance models. Descriptive analysis and 
content analysis of Annual Report will be performed to assess the ownership structure, the 
board of directors, leadership structure and financial statements of the companies to 
determine the optimal type of model that the I-REITs firms belong to. An attempt has been 
made to ascertain the type of governance model that best suit Malaysian I-REIT companies’ 
by using descriptive and content analysis. Since concentrated and pyramidal model are 
dominant in I-REIT companies, emerging governance model is the best model to characterize 
Malaysian I-REIT companies.  
Keywords:  Market-centric, relationship-based, transition and emerging governance models, 
Malaysian I-REIT, corporate governance 
 
Introduction  
 
 
The effectiveness of good governance has been a confronting issue since the shocking 
collapse of giant corporations. The issue has received considerable attention in the field of 
corporate governance based on an eye-wakening issue ever since the spate of scandals such as 
Enron which lead to regulatory reforms of corporate governance. The concept of good 
governance has been extensively discussed in the seminal works done by Berle and Means 
(1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976).  Among the precedent literature highlights on the 
role of ownership structure in influencing quality of corporate governance in a company. 
Previous scholars have found a significant correlation between ownership concentration and 
performance. Ownership concentration allows for greater incentive to the minority 
shareholders as the interest of the majority shareholders can be well-aligned. This can be an 
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important mechanism to mitigate the typical principal-agent problem as majority shareholders 
limit the opportunities for managerial expropriation by the board.  
There is extensive research being conducted on the assessment of corporate 
governance of real estate investment trust (REITs). For instance, a study by Hartzell, J, Sun, L 
and Titman, S., (2006) has been conducted to determine the effect of corporate governance on 
investment shows strong links between the investment behaviour and ownership. The result 
showed stronger corporate governance reacts more confidently to their investment 
opportunities. Their findings shows consistency with the theory of institution and independent 
directors’ responsibility which serve as a monitor and check on management’s propensity of 
overinvest in bad times. Besides, it can be said that governance affects weakly on the 
influence of raising REITs’ capital either equity or debt. However, their findings also 
highlighted that only institutional ownership has a stronger relationship with changes in debt, 
while insider ownership is significant for both equity and debt. 
In Australia, a study has been carried out to determine the influence of the corporate 
social responsibility factors and financial factors on REIT performance. Among the three 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) dimension, corporate governance is seen to be the 
most influential CSR factor as compared to environmental and social factors towards A-REIT 
performance by using the Jensen index (Newell and Lee, 2012). In their findings, A-REIT 
corporate governance is seen to have a more influential role in A-REIT pricing and becomes a 
critical factor during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its significant impact on A-REIT 
performance and the needs to address issues such as transparency, disclosure and the 
effectiveness of board directors’ decision making. 
On the other hand, Asian REITs can still be considered as greenfield from the 
perspective of corporate governance because REIT regimes are still relatively new in Asia. 
For instance, in Singapore, a study has been conducted to examine the relationship of 
corporate performance and the quality of corporate governance among externally managed 
listed Singapore REITs (S-REITs). S-REITs with higher corporate governance tend to register 
better risk-adjusted returns but do not outperform their operational performance (Lecomte, P 
and Ooi, J. 2013). Their findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between 
corporate governance and the performance of S-REITs but no relationship between corporate 
governance and operating performance of S-REITs. 
 
Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
 
 
Studies and literature documenting the corporate governance and Malaysian property market 
context are scarce, especially for Malaysia REITs. This is because in Malaysia, the issue of 
corporate governance was brought to the limelight since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Hence, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance is released in March 2000 and marked 
a significant milestone of a reform of corporate governance in Malaysia. 
Malaysia has a favorable concentrated ownership structure due to the prevalence of 
family-controlled and state-controlled firms (Shakir R., 2008b). A conflicting view arises with 
regards to the relationship between ownership structures with agency problem. On one hand, 
scholar like Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that domination by large shareholders can 
address the agency problem as they are in a better position to control the assets and the 
management of the company to align with their interests. In a similar vein, although Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that by linking remuneration of the management to the 
performance of the company could align their interest with shareholders interest, Morck, 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) oppose that expropriation can 
still exists when large shareholdings are conquered by the management who clearly have 
power to run the firm. This is because with large shareholdings, they can better sustain their 
position even at the expense of minority shareholders.  
A comprehensive study by Zhuang, Edwards and Capulong (2001) conducted in 
1998 found that Malaysia has a considerably high concentration of ownership with 58.8 per 
cent of the the total shareholdings (Figure 1), and the largest shareholders own 30 per cent of 
the shares. In terms of block ownership, Figure 2 shows that the largest sharheolders in 
Malaysian property firm  consists of  CEOs or owner, Directors, institutions and state 
governments.   
 
 
Figure 1: Ownership concentration 
 
Source: Zhuang, Edwards and Capulong (2001) 
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Figure 2: Block ownership 
 
Source: Shakir (2007) 
Given the multiplicity of governors, a fundamental question arises: which 
ownership structure best characterized REIT firms in Malaysia and which structure dominates 
the I-REITs firms. REITs companies have a unique legal setting and organizational structure. 
It’s more stringent regulation is said to increase the chances of mitigating agency problem 
better.   
Earlier researchers have concentrated on the study of ownership structure in REIT 
firms. However there is a dearth of research examining the governance model adopted by I-
REIT firms. Therefore, this paper tries to explore the four different governance mechanisms 
namely market-centric, relationship-based, transition and emerging governance model that 
best characterize I-REIT firms in Malaysia taking into account the unique legal setting and 
organizational structure under which Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) operate, changes 
the traditional principal-agent problem.  
 
 
Literature Review  
 
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance  
 
 
A retrospective empirical study on the relationship between ownership and firm performance 
has produced mixed findings. A positive relationship was found by Tan (2005) who studied 
221 Malaysian listed firms without identifying the identity of the block owners. In contradict 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) reported a negative association between market performance and 
the proportion of shares held by the five largest shareholders when they examined 347 firms 
during the period 1996-2000. This could be due to the economic recession during the period 
which makes any efforts towards increasing firm performance futile. However, a study by 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found no association between managerial ownership and market 
performance.  
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Ownership Structure of Malaysian Property Companies 
 
A common occurrence in East Asian economies is a block ownership by family and state.  
This pattern of ownership structure makes Asian countries different from the Western 
countries.  Another sailent feature is leadership because market performance is also affected 
by the leadership structure. For instance, Malaysian property firms have a dual leadership 
strucuture in which the positions of chairman and CEO are held by different individuals 
indicating that although family firms are common in Malaysian firms, they are seldom 
dominated by one individual as CEO tenure are not lengthy (Shakir, 2009). 
Another unique setting of Asian countries is the adoption of pyramid structures and 
cross-holdings. Control through a pyramid structure can be defined as owning a majority of 
the stock of one corporation that holds a majority of stock in another corporation. 
Crossholdings, which can be defined as ownership of shares in a company by another 
company is less visible in all countries except for Malaysia and Singapore, where cross-
holding is evident in about 15 per cent of its corporations (Shakir, 2007). This structure allows 
for a greater control by shareholders even with small ownership stakes (Claessens, Djankov 
and Lang, 1999).  
 
 
The Quadrilateral 
 
Study conducted by Bhasa (2004) has contributed to a new paradigm in the standard 
governance model around the world. His new emerging governance model extend the existing 
models; market-centric, relationship-based and transition governance model. The 
distinguishing aspect between these four models are the ownership structure and identity of 
block ownership. 
 
Type I: market centric governance model 
 
The market centric is common in developed countries such as US and UK. This model is 
characterised by diffusion of ownership across shareholders. The diffused ownership enables 
shareholders to diversify their own portfolio across different corporations, thereby lowering 
their dependency on only one corporation. However, agency cost may arise as shareholder is 
distanced from  monitoring the management’s behaviour. The absence of large shareholders 
to represent the minority shareholders’ interest may create governance problems when the 
management create information asymmetries and expropriate shareholder value. On another 
perspective, however, the agency problems can be mitigated by threats of takeover by the 
shareholders if the managers are found to be under-performing. The general assumption of 
this model are capital markets are strong and liquid; there exists a ready market for corporate 
control and ready access to managerial labor markets. 
 
Type II: relationship-based governance model 
 
Relationship-based governance model is an opposite from the market-centric model. In this 
model, ownership is largely concentrated and capital market is illiquid. Large shareholding is 
dominated by banks. The model is called as relationship-based because of the commitment 
entered into by the bank which is prepared to bail out corporations that are facing bad times. 
The Anglo-American countries like Japan, Korea and German are the glaring examples of this 
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model of governance. Despite the effectiveness of bank as a monitoring mechanism to 
managerial behavior, it poses its own shortcoming when the bank dominates the corporation’s 
decision-making process; they steal the professional expertise from the management.  
 
Type III: transition governance model 
 
Transition governance model is more prevalence in Central and Eastern European countries 
where restructuring was mass implemented. Upon privatization, this model tries to emulate 
the market model of governance. Akin to the type II firms, transition governance firms are 
also characterized by cross shareholding namely individuals and corporations. The model is 
named as transition to reflect the transition of firms from state-owned to private ownership. 
The “spontaneous privatization” makes it difficult to the privatized company to stand with its 
own leg because the state intervention has taken a heavy toll beforehand. Though this model 
shift the system toward more competitive and functional system, the general apathy is that 
market may lose confidence and are cynical to the ability of the corporation to protect their 
investment interests due to the weak institutional set up to confront financial problem. In 
terms of the ownership structure, it may look like that the firm has moved to a dispersed 
ownership, yet the nature of cross shareholdings casts a doubt on the diffuse nature of 
ownership. Hence, this model is a mixture of concentrated and diffused ownership.   
 
Type IV: emerging governance model 
 
Type IV model is said to be a successful governance model to replicate successful economies. 
It characterizes the successful of type III model whereby successful transition from state-held 
firms to private-owned firms, with an existence of vibrant capital markets, existence of both 
large shareholding and minority shareholding. Business groups dominate the type IV 
economies with family retaining a significant amount of shareholding across a wider cross-
section on industries. Thus, cross-shareholding coupled with concentrated and pyramidal 
ownership structures is the best feature of this model. India and Taiwan set the best examples 
of this model. However, agency cost may arise as control by the family over the large 
shareholding is high and may consequently expropriate the minority’s interest.  However, the 
existence of vibrant stock market, the existence of the market for corporate control and a 
strong legal system in place may mitigate this agency problem.  
 
 
Malaysian Islamic REITs 
 
Malaysia currently has 16 Real Estate Investment Trusts (M-REITs), of which three are 
Shariah compliant with one Islamic REIT (I-REITs) being Malaysia’s first stapled REIT, 
KLCC Property REIT (KLCCP REIT). Islamic REITs are different from conventional REITs 
as they have to comply with Shariah principles as outlined by the Guidelines for Islamic 
REITs issued on 21st November 2005 by Securities Commission (Securities Commission, 
2005). The guidelines are: 1) Non-permissible rental activities; 2) Rental from tenant who 
operates mixed activities; 3) Method of calculating the ratio of rental of non-permissible 
activities; 4) Acquisition of real estate; 5) Renting out to new tenant; 6) Instruments used in 
investment, deposit and financing for Islamic REITs; 7) Takaful coverage and 8) Risk 
management issues.  
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Many of the literature focus on the REIT performance as a whole and did not treat I-
REITs as a different category of REITs which has a unique ethical Shariah compliant 
framework. For instance, there are many studies on the performance analysis on Malaysian 
REITs (M-REITs) was conducted. Previous research indicates REITs outperformed market 
indices during and post GFC period (Ong et al, 2012; Yusof and Nawawi, 2012). M-REITs 
are considered as a less risky alternative investment as opposed to listed equity because M-
REITs possess lower degree of overall risk or volatility as compared to the broader market 
(Mohamad and Zolkifli, 2014; Chai et al, 2011; Tan, 2009). Apart from that, M-REITs which 
are traded at Net Asset Value (NAV) premium are generally better companies in terms of 
disclosure, transparency, liquidity, corporate democracy and management (Ong et. al., 2011). 
In term of relationship between M-REITs and Asian REITs, there is a positive correlation and 
Malaysian REIT is found to be lagging against the Asian REITs for up to two months 
(Nawawi et.al., 2010).  
In term of the performance of Islamic REITs as compared to the conventional REITs, 
many research shows that I-REITs have performed well especially during the GFC. Islamic 
M-REITs have shown a high degree of robustness during the GFC and outperform 
conventional REITs. (Helmi, 2013; Alhenwi and Hassan, 2011; Newell and Osmadi, 2009). 
Conversely, by using different approach of measurement, the findings conclude that Shariah 
Compliant portfolios tend to underperform the REIT portfolio (Mohamad and Saad, 2012; 
Ibrahim and Ong, 2006). 
Apart from that, according to a study conducted on three Islamic REITs’ Return on 
Equity (ROE) as compared to conventional M-REITs, it has shown that Islamic REIT perform 
well in providing results with a high quality of the management strength during the GFC 
(Osmadi and Razali, 2013). Besides, previous studies discovered that when there is an 
increased of dividend, normally the performance of I-REITs will also increase (Hashim et. al., 
2013).  
 
 
Methodology 
 
Sample Data 
 
The sample data comprise firms listed under the property counter which traded at Bursa 
Malaysia and comply with the Shariah guidelines. There were 16 Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (M-REITs) in the Bursa Malaysia, but only three are Shariah compliant which are: Axis 
REITs, Al-Aqar Healthcare REIT and KLCC Property Holdings Berhad.  
 
Sources of data 
 
Relevant data pertaining to the ownership structure, board of directors, leadership structure 
and financial statements of the companies are retrieved from the annual reports 2013 of the 
individual companies which can be assessed online via the Bursa Malaysia website. 
 
Data Measurement 
 
Descriptive analysis and content analysis of Annual Report will be performed to assess the 
ownership structure, the board of directors, leadership structure and financial statements of 
the companies to determine the optimal type of model that the I-REITs firms belong to. 
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Descriptive analysis was used to explain the pattern of ownership structure, the board of 
directors and leadership structure. Analysis was made from two sources which are literature 
review and Annual Report. The content of Annual Report was used to derive at the required 
data and literature review was used to comprehend the model that the I-REITs firms belong 
to.  
The measurement of variables can be seen in Table 1. The terms of measurement 
used is similar to the study conducted by Shakir (2008b). Shakir (2008b) measured blocked 
ownerhsip as percentage of shares owned more than 5% of the overall outstanding 
shareholders in the company. Board size indicates number of directors in the board. Outside 
directors representation is measured based on the number of non-management executive 
directors in the board and high outside directors representation is classified if they represent 
1/3 or over from the number of all directors in the company. This indicator is in line with the 
criteria stated in the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (2007). Outside Directors (%) 
is a proxy for board independence, and the researchers expect that the higher the degree of 
board independence, the stronger the monitoring role the board can provide (e.g., see 
Weisbach 1988). Our other governance variable is a measure of share ownership of the CEO.  
 
 
Table 1: The measurement of variables 
 
 
 
 
Findings 
 
Descriptive statistics of ownership structure 
 
Descriptive statistics on overall data are presented in Table 2. The statistics in Table 2 showed 
an average of 48.88 per cent of block ownership found in property firms. The ownership  
pattern is similar to those reported by Claessens, Djankov and Lang in 1999 who found that 
concentrated ownership is common in Asian listed corporations. CEOs owned a very 
insignificant number of shares in the company with percentage close to zero per cent. Board 
size is in an ideal number which is 8, considered not too large or too small and the outside 
director representation mean of 6.67 which is approximately 80% is seen as good. This 
evaluation is given based on the benchmark of at least 60% outside representation as ideal 
board stated in Weisbach (1988). Family business is nil in the i-REIT companies indicating 
full-pledge companies.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Error Median 
Block ownership (%) 48.88 13.30 36.3 
Board size 8.33 0.33 8 
Outside directors 6.67 0.88 7 
Family business 0 0 0 
CEO ownership(%) 0.08012 0.07497 0.0089 
Equity  1079660499.67 363371294.24 750966000 
Market value (RM billion) 4.56 3.03 2.2 
 
 
Analysis of Findings 
 
The finding signifies that Malaysian Islamic property firms have the same structure as other 
listed firms in terms of block ownership. The mean figure of 48.88% is considered as high as 
in block ownership. Unlike other studies, this study found no block of ownership by family 
firm. These results imply that institutional ownership being block owners monitors the firms’ 
investment policies better as they own the majority voice during general meeting to align the 
company’s direction to their interest. This reflects a good projection for performance because 
as stated by Baek, Kang and Park (2004), firms with high family concentrated ownership tend 
to have low stock performance.  
Apart from that, the findings indicate a mean of 8 for board size. This supports the 
findings of Shakir (2008a) which market seems to have a preference for small boards with 
lesser number of outside directors, but with more executive working directors and a mean of 7 
directors for Malaysian listed properties companies is similar to those of American, British, 
Canadian and European firms. 
Similarly, the study also found small CEOs ownership of shares contribute better to 
outside director representation as the result found by propenents such as Ghosh and Sirmans 
(2003) which has found strong CEOs ownership structure with small outside representation. 
The insignificant CEO ownership (value: 0.08012%) may reduce expropriation of rent by the 
CEOs and thus, maintaining a sound corporate governance in place.  
Based on this finding, putting all the puzzles together, Malaysian I-REIT has an ideal 
governance structure with high institutional ownership with insignificant family and CEO 
ownership. The institutional ownership represents the minority shareholders’ voice to ensure 
firms invest in assets that will maximize the shareholders’ interest.  
Based on the above results, it can be concluded that Malaysian I-REITs firm best 
characterized the type IV model except for the family ownership. Type IV (emerging 
governance model) is dominated by large cross-shareholding coupled with concentrated and 
pyramidal ownership structures.  
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Conclusion 
 
Corporate governance deals with various aspects including governance structures. Similar to 
their counterparts in other Asian countries, high concentrated ownership is very common in 
Malaysian I-REIT firms with an average of 48.88 per cent of block ownership. However, the 
case of I-REIT firms are more favorable because the block ownership is not dominated by 
either family business or CEO owenership. This put I-REIT firms under the type IV model 
(emerging governance model), but in a better position. Perhaps, a neo-governance model may 
be introduced to supplant the emerging governance model. The Islamic concept adopted by 
the firms may contribute to this favorable figure as over-domination by individual for own 
benefit without considering others is prohibited in Islam. Given the unique result, future 
studies could incorporate the role of islamic and conventional concept to solve the causality 
between ownership structure and firm performance.  
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